A new war of attrition
Just ten years ago, on these days, some middle officials in Tehran were celebrating the “political conquest” of the Middle Eastern Arab capital one by one.
Kabul 24: With the fall of the Yemeni government, after Beirut, Baghdad and Damascus, Sana’a was the fourth capital that came under the political and geopolitical influence of Tehran and became a part of the axis of resistance.
It is surprising that now Israel is bombing all four countries on a daily basis, and its direct and indirect war with Tehran has practically extended to the borders of Iran and Israel.
The current war is actually a battle over the future of the Middle East and drawing new security and political equations for it.
In other words, the struggle is over the achievements and consequences of the Arab Spring revolutions and the occupation of Iraq by America.
Chaotic events that changed the face of the Middle East and turned Iran into a regional power and its superior force, at least temporarily.
Since the day it called Nasrallah’s assassination operation the New Order, Israel has not missed any opportunity to state that its goal is to change the Middle East.
The current Middle East is basically the result of the agreement of the colonial agreement of Sais and Pico a hundred years ago, which drew the current borders.
The 6-day war of 1967, which made Israel a regional power, is an important turning point in the history of the region.
the third station; As mentioned, it was the Arab Spring that brought Iran into the Arab East and brought Turkey back to the region after a century away.
After two hot decades, when the region was burning in the fire of competition and tension between the aforementioned powers and new actors such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it suddenly entered a period of relative calm with an unexpected improvement in the relations between the main variables.
The sound of weapons in Syria and Yemen gradually became silent, and Turkey, Iran and the Arabs turned to some degree of de-escalation.
However, the conflict between Iran and Israel remained and with the increase of friction between the two sides in Syria, it finally reached a boiling point in Gaza and Lebanon.
In the light of the recent situation, it is difficult to believe in the neutrality of the Arab governments.
There is a strong suspicion that Israel, which talks about changing the Middle East, has the mind and heart of Iran’s old rivals in the region minus Türkiye.
By outsourcing their security, the aforementioned Arab countries have focused on the economy and have prayed for Iran to be pushed back from the region and to confront its nuclear program.
Ten years ago, when the JCPOA agreement was signed, the United States was thinking that through JCPOA II and JCPIII, it would manage the tension in the Middle East and divide it peacefully into spheres of influence among the main players.
With the failure of the JCPOA and the impasse of diplomacy, reaching the current point and the explosion of existing conflicts was not far from expected.
Of course, in the current situation, it is not logical to reduce the deep gap between Iran and Israel to ideological differences.
This problem exists, but by combining it with geopolitical and strategic motivations, it has become bolder and more prominent than ever.
Ten or twelve years ago, Obama said in defense of reconciliation and interaction with Iran;
Iran is a serious actor and exists on the ground.
His intention was for Tehran to rely on a network of proxy forces and non-state actors from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea.
Today, Iran’s earthly presence is challenged by the sovereignty of the Israelis in the sky: in fact, the fight between the king of the earth and the king of the sky!
In this way, Israel has turned the proxy war into a direct one, and by weakening Iran’s regional arms, it intends to make Iran’s asymmetric war strategy worthless.
Iran’s midnight attacks, which were carried out after a hard period of self-restraint, indicate a forced surrender to changing the rules of war.
With Israel’s possible retaliation, it is possible to imagine a war of attrition between the parties.
Similar to the war of attrition between Egypt and Israel between March 1969 and August 1970.
In these 18 months, in addition to the daily exchange of fire between the sides and air and sea forces, Israel repeatedly attacked Egypt’s vital infrastructure deep in its territory.
The war of attrition was merely a bloody interlude between two larger and wider wars: the devastating defeat of 1967 and the relative and initial victory of the 1973 war.
The final result was the Camp David peace treaty and Egypt’s withdrawal from the conflict with Israel and the practical abandonment of the leadership of the Arab world and the Middle East.
Considering the geographical distance between Iran and Israel, a war of attrition between them that could last for months and years is not out of the question.
But not necessarily with the same results and consequences.
Iran is the last major country in the region that still maintains its anti-Israel positions.
Its war with Israel will probably be the last war of the Jewish state with a Middle Eastern country.
In any way, its consequences determine part of the future trends.
Saladin Khadio