The statements of American and Israeli officials in recent days and hours indicate a new escalation in the region’s situation, prompting various hypotheses about the potential target country.
Kabul 24: If Trump’s statements alone are considered, in addition to countries in the Middle East, Nigeria and Venezuela, located in Africa and the Americas respectively, are candidates for bombardment!
Naturally, these options are not particularly relevant to Israel. Thus, the options must be narrowed down to the Middle East, considering targets such as Iran, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon.
Under current circumstances, an attack on Iran or Yemen’s Houthis is unlikely and, at the very least, not among the attackers’ strategic priorities.
The two remaining options are Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Israel is likely planning a large-scale attack on Hezbollah, similar to those in September and October of last year.
The strong stances of the U.S. and Israel against the Lebanese government and Hezbollah, along with their dissatisfaction with the group’s failure to disarm, support this view.
Tel Aviv and Washington have concluded that last year’s war and the almost daily attacks following the ceasefire were insufficient to fully weaken the organization, necessitating another war.
At the same time, they have pressured the Lebanese government to “Lebanize” this conflict in the medium term.With this in mind, they may have lumped the PMF with Hezbollah.
The PMF is the only Iranian-aligned proxy group that has largely survived the blows of the past two years and likely played a substitute role in the post-Assad era, connecting Iran to Dahiyeh and aiding in Hezbollah’s reconstruction.
Thus, an attack on the PMF and its weakening would not only strike Iran and Hezbollah but also diminish the influence and standing of Iraq’s Shiites in the upcoming elections.
For the first time in two decades, Iraq’s Shiites are entering the electoral process at a time when Iran’s dominance in the country and the Shiite geopolitical position in the Middle East are in decline.
Further weakening the so-called resistance axis in the region will intensify the dynamics and internal rivalries within the Coordination Framework, the main political bloc of Iraq’s Shiites.
This will likely lead to greater empowerment of Sudani and a reduced influence of Nouri al-Maliki. Post-election Iraq will reflect the profound regional changes of the past two years.
Salaruddin Khadiv
