Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, has embarked on a strategic maneuver in the South Caucasus that many describe as an “unprecedented success” in regional diplomacy, while others see it as a gamble.
To understand the reasons behind this success (or at least its progress) and to draw unbiased lessons from it, three key factors must be examined.
First, clarity of purpose. From the outset, Aliyev knew exactly what he wanted: a land route through Armenian territory connecting Azerbaijan directly to Nakhchivan and, ultimately, Turkey. He articulated this demand openly in speeches and international negotiations, avoiding ambiguity.
This clear objective allowed Baku to pursue coordinated and sustained diplomatic and military pressure, particularly after the 2020 Karabakh War, transforming the Zangezur idea from a concept on paper into an operational reality.Second, skillful coalition-building. Baku strategically pursued multi-layered alliances.
Turkey provided cultural and military backing, serving as a powerful ally. Israel, a key security partner and supplier of military technology, wielded influence in Washington to counter the Armenian lobby. Meanwhile, Aliyev kept the door open to Russia, even when Moscow leaned closer to Armenia.
This approach, known as “hedging” in international relations, is one of the few ways for mid-sized countries in sensitive geopolitical positions to gain leverage. Aliyev executed it with precision.
Third, linking security to economic interests. Azerbaijan framed the Zangezur Corridor not merely as a military or security route but as a vital link in the “Middle Corridor” connecting Asia and Europe. This narrative attracted economic stakeholders and even some neutral governments. By presenting the project as a driver of international trade rather than a mere border dispute, Baku increased pressure on its opponents.However, these advances have not come without costs, and some view them as a gamble. The primary challenge is the reaction from Iran and Russia.
Tehran fears that a corridor under Azerbaijan’s influence (and by extension, Turkey and Israel) near its borders could disrupt the traditional regional balance. For Iran, Zangezur is not just a transit route but a symbol of maintaining or losing strategic depth in the South Caucasus. Russia, keen to preserve its role as the region’s security guarantor, is wary of fundamental changes without its involvement.
The second challenge is political costs on the international stage. The Armenian community, both within Armenia and its influential diaspora in Europe and the U.S., holds significant sway.
Any agreement perceived as coercive or one-sided against Armenia could spark political and human rights campaigns against Baku.
While these reactions have not yet been a major obstacle, they could tarnish Azerbaijan’s international image in the long term.The third issue is control and sovereignty.
When a transit corridor is established with international guarantees, the operating country must share some authority or oversight with external entities.
Today’s success could become tomorrow’s limitation, especially if political dynamics shift or external supporters change their stance.Taken together, these factors show that Aliyev has largely succeeded in his objectives so far.
He regained control of Karabakh through a blend of hard and soft power and elevated the Zangezur Corridor from a peripheral idea to a central issue in regional politics.
Even if the corridor is not yet fully operational, its place in South Caucasus dynamics is solidified. However, this success is not absolute but conditional. If Baku fails to address Iran and Russia’s concerns, offer tangible economic concessions to Armenia, or navigate shifts in international support, these gains could quickly erode.
The Zangezur Corridor, at its core, is a laboratory for testing a small-to-medium state’s ability to capitalize on opportunities and manage threats in a complex environment. Ilham Aliyev has earned a passing grade in advancing his country’s national interests thus far, but the ultimate test is far from over
