With today’s attack on Beirut, Israel has, in popular parlance, tried to “pull the cat by the tail before the wedding.” While the countdown to signing the Iran-US understanding had begun, today’s noon strike on Beirut’s southern suburbs directly challenged it.
Kabul 24: This attack has exposed the fragile and fluid nature of this minimal understanding. The prospects for operationalizing and sustaining the draft agreement between Iran and America, and its successful entry into the second phase of negotiations, depend on a wide range of practical and field developments of which Israel’s disruptive actions are only one.
The bombing of the southern suburbs is not merely an expression of dissatisfaction with the agreement; it is an effort to establish the independent agency of a third party that is not directly present at the negotiating table.
Israel is determined not to allow Iran to return to the rules that existed before February 28.Given this, the question arises: despite Israel’s recognized right to independent action, does any real chance remain for the success and durability of the agreement?
The answer largely depends on Iran’s type of reaction. Will it act on its previous threats to respond to the bombing of Beirut?As mentioned, Israel’s dissatisfaction is not the only factor weakening the agreement and obstructing a final Iran-US peace.
Every single disputed issue from uranium enrichment levels and stockpiles, to the release of assets, oil exemptions, and the complex multi-layered sanctions system is prone to escalating differences and derailing the diplomatic process.
Both Iran and America are well aware of this. What has brought them to this point is the outcome of a new strategic configuration following a hundred days of war and semi-war.Iran, at a minimum, needs a temporary few-month breathing space free of war and naval blockade to reorganize its crisis-stricken economy.
America needs the same: the global economy has reached the limits of its tolerance due to rising energy prices, and it can no longer be sustained by Trump’s talk therapy and psychological management.In short, today’s agreement is the product of a partial stalemate, and one cannot realistically hope for its continuation and stabilization in the medium term.
It is highly likely that Iran, in order to save the drafted agreement, will not respond to today’s attack.However, in the coming days and weeks, repeated Israeli attacks on Lebanon and possibly on Iran itself may force Iran to react, triggering a new round of tit-for-tat strikes.
The experience of the past two and a half years has shown that the cooling of weapons and official ceasefires in the Lebanon and Gaza files do not mean tying Israel’s hands.
If the extension of the ceasefire with Iran follows a similar pattern, will Tehran once again turn to its primary deterrent lever in the Strait of Hormuz?And if it reaches that stage, wouldn’t it mean a return to square one?
Salahuddin Khadiv
