Having a “theoretical framework” is not equivalent to holding an “ideology.” When we say someone holds an ideological view toward phenomena and issues, it means they approach reality with a pre-established, relatively dogmatic conceptual structure, comprehending phenomena primarily within the narrow boundaries defined by that framework.
Kabul 24: In such a scenario, the theoretical framework resembles a net cast over reality, dictating what can be observed, how it should be interpreted, and what qualifies as valid evidence in the first place.
In other words, through an ideological lens, an individual possesses a set of relatively fixed beliefs or conclusions about the world. When confronting reality, rather than testing those beliefs, they actively search for confirming instances and evidence. For them, the outcome is largely predetermined, and the world is navigated simply to gather proof for that preset conclusion.
If evidence incompatible with the framework emerges, it may be dismissed, downplayed, or reinterpreted through auxiliary hypotheses—specifically *ad hoc* hypotheses—so that it remains fully compatible with the theoretical system.
This is precisely the critique Karl Popper leveled against Marxism and psychoanalysis in *The Poverty of Historicism*. For Popper, the problem with these systems was not merely that they were vast and powerful theories, but that their proponents could interpret almost any conceivable event, after the fact, in a way that corroborated the theory.
If an event occurred as expected, it was counted as confirmation; if it occurred contrary to expectation, it was subsumed into the framework by introducing an auxiliary or *ad hoc* explanation. Consequently, the theory was systematically immunized against facing any genuinely falsifying evidence.
To be sure, relying on auxiliary hypotheses is not inherently unscientific. Virtually all scientific theories in real-world testing depend on a network of assumptions and secondary hypotheses.
However, as Popper pointed out, the problem begins when an auxiliary hypothesis is constructed solely to rescue a theory from contradictory evidence, without being independently testable or offering new explanatory and predictive power. In such cases, rather than contributing to the refinement of a theory, the auxiliary hypothesis becomes a tool to immunize it against reality.
From this perspective, ideology transforms the “fishing net” into a “cage.” The framework ceases to be a tool for understanding reality; instead, reality must be selectively filtered, reduced, or reinterpreted until it fits inside the pre-existing boundaries of the framework.
Yet, not every theoretical framework is ideological. Without conceptual and theoretical structures, we are fundamentally incapable of coherent perception. A completely neutral view, devoid of all concepts and theories and experiencing reality in its raw, unmediated form, is an epistemological illusion.
In Kantian terms, sensory data cannot turn into structured knowledge without concepts. Therefore, a conceptual framework is not an obstacle standing between us and reality, but a necessary precondition for comprehending and structuring it.
The fundamental distinction between a scientific theoretical framework and an ideological one lies not in the mere possession of a framework, but in how that framework relates to evidence and the possibility of error.
A scientific theoretical framework considers itself fallible. A theory must leave open the possibility that evidence may emerge against it, and that it must be revised or discarded in the face of compelling counter-evidence.
This is the core of Popper’s concept of “falsifiability”: a theory must allow for the possibility of being wrong and accept tests whose outcomes are not guaranteed in its favor beforehand.
This openness can also be expressed using Bayesian language. In a Bayesian framework, we begin with degrees of initial belief (priors) regarding hypotheses, updating these beliefs as new evidence arrives.
Evidence can strengthen or weaken our confidence in a hypothesis, transforming prior beliefs into posterior beliefs. Thus, in this view, a theoretical framework is not a rigid, eternal structure, but a dynamic, fallible construct that continually adjusts to new data.
The defining characteristic of a modern, scientific theoretical framework is its “commitment to self-correction.” Rather than forcing reality to conform to its premises, it exposes itself to the resistance of reality.
Naturally, this distinction should not be oversimplified. Thomas Kuhn demonstrated that even scientists working within periods of “normal science” occasionally resist anomalies. They may ignore certain discrepancies, treat them as temporary puzzles, or attempt to preserve the dominant paradigm through minor adjustments and auxiliary hypotheses.
In this respect, the behavior of scientists during normal science can sometimes bear an external resemblance to the ideological defense of a thought system.
Crucially, however, within the institution of science, the accumulation of anomalies eventually leads to crisis, undermines the existing paradigm, and ultimately forces a shift. Under Kuhnian conditions, science is capable of undergoing a “scientific revolution” and adopting a paradigm shift.
Therefore, the boundary between a theoretical framework and an ideology should not be sought in a dichotomy between “having a theory” and “having no theory.” No coherent knowledge exists without concepts and frameworks. The fundamental difference lies in how a framework engages with evidence, critique, and fallibility.
An open epistemological framework states: *”I understand the world through these concepts and hypotheses, but evidence may force me to revise them.”*
A closed ideological framework, in its extreme form, asserts: *”Reality must ultimately turn out to be whatever my framework permits it to be.”*
Ultimately, the goal is not to abandon theoretical frameworks altogether—an objective that is neither possible nor desirable. The objective is to construct and maintain frameworks that, while essential for cognition, do not become cognitive prisons; frameworks that render reality intelligible without precluding the possibility that reality might disagree with them.
Jamshid Mehrpoor
